Abstract-This paper investigates price-based resource allocation strategies for the uplink transmission of a spectrum-sharing femtocell network, in which a central macrocell is underlaid with distributed femtocells, all operating over the same frequency band as the macrocell. Assuming that the macrocell base station (MBS) protects itself by pricing the interference from the femtocell users, a Stackelberg game is formulated to study the joint utility maximization of the macrocell and the femtocells subject to a maximum tolerable interference power constraint at the MBS. In particular, two pricing schemes: uniform pricing and non-uniform pricing, are investigated. Then, the Stackelberg equilibriums for the proposed games are studied, and the relationship between the two pricing schemes is examined. It is shown that the nonuniform pricing scheme maximizes the revenue of the MBS, while the uniform pricing scheme maximizes the sum-rate of the femtocell users.
I. INTRODUCTION
The femtocell, which is enabled by a home base station (HBS), was proposed as one of the most promising technologies for improving the indoor experience of cellular mobile users. HBSs deployed and managed by the customers at home or in the offices, are short-range low-power base stations that are connected to the service provider via the third party backhaul (e.g. Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) or cable moderm) [1] . With the help of such HBS, femtocell users can experience better indoor voice and data reception, and lower their transmit power for prolonging battery life. From the network operator's perspective, HBS offsets the burden on the macrocell base station (MBS), consequently improving the network coverage and capacity.
In practice, it is more favorable to operate the macrocell and femtocells by sharing spectrum rather than splitting spectrum between tiers from either an infrastructure or spectrum availability perspective. However, for spectrum-sharing twotier femtocell networks, the cross-tier and inter-cell interference greatly restrict the network performance. Therefore, the interference mitigation in two-tier femtocell networks has become an active area of research. A great deal of scholarly work [2] - [4] has recently appeared in the literature on the design of power control and interference mitigation strategies for spectrum-sharing femtocell networks.
On the other hand, spectrum sharing with interference control is not unique to femtocell networks, since it is also an important design approach for cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In a CRN, secondary users are allowed to transmit over the frequency bands of primary users as long as their resulted aggregate interference is kept below an acceptable level. This constraint, known as interference power constraint, has been proved to be a practically useful technique to control the interference in spectrum-sharing CRNs [5] - [8] . However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this methodology has not been applied to the design of interference control strategies for femtocell networks. The main difficulty for such an application lies in the following fact. Unlike cognitive radio devices, the femtocell users are ordinary mobile terminals that may not have the environment-aware sensing and self power-adaptation capabilities to control the interference to the macrocell or other underlaid femtocells. Therefore, imposing interference power constraints at the femtocell user side to implement the interference control in femtocell networks is not practical.
In this paper, by exploiting the unique feature of femtocell networks, we apply the interference power constraints to the design of interference control for the uplink transmission of femtocell networks in a new way: Instead of imposing interference power constraints at the femtocell user side, we assume that such constraints are imposed at the MBS, which controls the received interference through pricing the interference from femtocell users. The corresponding interference prices are sent to femtocell users through the existing backhaul links between the MBS and HBSs. This way, femtocell users are able to design their power allocation strategies in a decentralized manner based on the interference prices received from their own HBSs. Comparing to existing approaches in the literature, our proposed method perfectly controls the cross-tier interference for femtocell networks, and at the same time greatly reduces the complexity of resource allocation implemented at the femtocell user side.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a two-tier femtocell network consisting of one central MBS serving a region R, within which there are in total N femtocells deployed by home or office users. It is assumed that all femtocells access the same frequency band as the macrocell. In each femtocell, there is one dedicated HBS providing service for several wireless devices. Each wireless device is regarded as one user in the femtocell network. For analytical tractability, we assume that at any given frequency band (e.g., one frequency sub-channel in OFDMA-based femtocells), there is at most one scheduled active user during each signaling time-slot in each femtocell, i.e., orthogonal uplink transmission is adopted. We also assume that the mutual interference between the femtocells can be neglected due to path and penetration loss.
Under the above framework, for a given time-slot, the uplink transmission for the two-tier femtocell network can be described in Fig. 1 . As shown in Fig. 1 , user i denotes the scheduled user transmitting to its HBS B i , where i = 1, 2, · · · , N. All the terminals involved are assumed to be each equipped with a single antenna. For the purpose of exposition, all the channels involved are assumed to be block-fading, i.e., the channels remain constant during each transmission block, but possibly change from one block to another. The channel power gain of the link between user i and HBS B j is denoted by h j,i . The channel power gain of the link between user i and the MBS is given by g i . All the channel power gains are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables (RVs) each having a continuous probability density function (PDF). The additive noises at HBSs are assumed to be independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) RVs, each of which is assumed to have zero mean and variance σ 2 i , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Notation: In this paper, the boldface capital and lowercase letters are used to denote matrices and vectors, respectively. The inequalities for vectors are defined element-wise, i.e., x y represents x i ≤ y i , ∀i, where x i and y i are the ith elements of the vector x and y, respectively. The superscript T denotes the transpose operation of a vector.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the Stackelberg game formulation for the price-based power allocation scheme. Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game is investigated.
Stackelberg game [9] is a strategic game that consists of a leader and several followers competing with each other on certain resources. The leader moves first and the followers move subsequently. In this paper, we formulate the MBS as the leader, and the femtocell users as the followers. The MBS (leader) imposes a set of prices on per unit of received interference power from each femtocell user. Then, the femtocell users (followers) update their power allocation strategies to maximize their individual utilities based on the assigned interference prices.
Under the above game model, at the MBS side, the revenue maximization problem can be formulated as Problem 3.1:
where μ is the interference price vector defined as
T , with μ i denoting the interference price for user i; I i (μ i ) is the interference power received from femtocell user i; Q is the maximum aggregate interference from all femtocell users that the MBS can tolerate.
At the femtocell side, the utility maximization problem for user i can be formulated as Problem 3.2:
where λ i is the utility gain per unit transmission rate for user i, p i is the transmit power of user i, and σ 2 i is the background noise at HBS B i taking into account of the interference from the macrocell users. Without loss of generality, it is assumed for convenience that σ 2 i = σ 2 , ∀i in the rest of this paper. Note that ∀i, p i is actually a function of μ i under the Stackelberg game formulation, which indicates that the amount of the interference quota that each femtocell user is willing to buy is dependent on its assigned interference price.
Problems 3.1 and 3.2 together form a Stackelberg game. The objective of this game is to find the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) point(s) from which neither the leader (MBS) nor the followers (femtocell users) have incentives to deviate. For the proposed game, the SE is defined as follows. 
At the MBS's side, since there is only one player, the best response of the MBS can be readily obtained by solving Problem 3.1. To achieve this end, the best response functions for the followers (femtocell users) must be obtained first, since the leader (MBS) derives its best response function based on those of the followers or femtocell users. For the proposed game in this paper, the SE can be obtained as follows: For a given μ, Problem 3.2 is solved first. Then, with the obtained best response functions p * of the femtocells, we solve Problem 3.1 for the optimal interference price μ * .
It is not difficult to see that, in the above formulation, we assume that the MBS charges each femtocell user with a different interference price. We thus refer to this pricing scheme as non-uniform pricing. In addition, we consider a special case of this pricing scheme referred to as uniform pricing, in which the MBS charges each femtocell with the same interference price, i.e., μ i = μ, ∀i. In the following, these two pricing schemes are investigated, respectively.
IV. NON-UNIFORM PRICING
For the non-uniform pricing scheme, the MBS sets different interference prices for different femtocell users. At the femtocell side, the utility maximization problem is given by Problem 3.2, which is a convex optimization problem. Therefore, the optimal solution for Problem 3.2 can be easily obtained in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1: For a given interference price μ i , the optimal solution for Problem 4.1 is given by
with (·) + max (·, 0). From Lemma 4.1, it is observed that if the interference price is too high, i.e., μ i > λihi,i giσ 2 , user i will not transmit. This indicates that user i will be removed from the game. Substituting (6) into Problem 3.1, the optimization problem at the MBS side can be formulated as Problem 4.1:
s.t.
Note that the above problem is non-convex, since the objective function is a convex function of μ (maximization of a convex function is in general non-convex). Nevertheless, it is shown in the following that this problem can be converted to a series of convex subproblems.
For user i, we introduce the following indicator function
With the above indicator functions for i = 1, 2, · · · , N, Problem 4.1 can be reformulated as
Problem 4.2:
where
It is not difficult to see that the above problem is non-convex due to χ. However, this problem has a nice property that is explored as follows. For a given indicator vector χ, it is easy to verify that Problem 4.2 is convex.
Next, we consider a special case of Problem 4.2 by assuming that Q is large enough such that all the users are admitted. As a result, the indicators for all users are equal to 1, i.e., μ i < 
Obviously, this problem is convex. The optimal solution of this problem is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1: The optimal solution to Problem 4.3 is given by
Now, we relate the optimal solution of Problem 4.3 to that of the original problem, i.e., Problem 4.1, in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2: The interference prices given by (15) are the optimal solutions of Problem 4.1 if and only if
hi,i . Proof: The proof is omitted here due to the space limitation. Interested readers can refer to [10] for details.
With the results obtained above, we are now ready to solve Problem 4.1. The optimal solution of Problem 4.1 is given in the following theorem. 
and
Proof: If Q > T N , the optimal μ * is readily obtained by Proposition 4.2. For other intervals of Q, e.g., T N −1 ≤ Q ≤ T N , the proof of the optimality for the corresponding μ * can be obtained similarly as Proposition 4.2, and is thus omitted. The proof of Theorem 4.1 thus follows.
Remark: From a system design perspective, the results given in (16) are very useful in practice. For instance, if the MBS sets the interference price for a user to ∞, this user will not transmit; however, if the system is designed to admit all the N femtocell users, the interference tolerance margin Q at the MBS needs to be set to be above T N . Now, the Stackelberg game for the non-uniform pricing case is completely solved. The SE for this Stackelberg game is then given as follows.
Proposition 4.3:
The SE for the Stackelberg game formulated in Problems 4.1 and 4.2 is (μ * , p * ), where μ * is given by (16), and p * is given by (6) . In practice, the proposed game is implemented as follows. 
T by Theorem 4.1. Second, with the obtained threshold vector T , the MBS decides the interference price for each femtocell user based on its available interference margin Q according to (16). Then, the interference prices are fed back to femtocell users through the backhaul links between the MBS and the HBSs.
Finally, after receiving the interference prices from their respective HBSs, the femtocell users decide their transmit power levels according to (6) .
V. UNIFORM PRICING
For the uniform pricing scheme, the MBS sets a uniform interference price for all the femtocell users, i.e., μ i = μ, ∀i. With a uniform price μ, the optimal power allocation for femtocell users can be easily obtained from (6) by setting
At the MBS's side, the optimization problem reduces to Problem 5.1:
This problem has the same structure as Problem 4.1. Therefore, it can be solved by the same method as Problem 4.1. Details are thus omitted here for brevity. 
hi,i , ∀K ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. From Corollary 5.1, it is not difficult to observe that the optimal price μ * is unique for a given Q. Consequently, the SE for this Stackelberg game is unique.
Comparing to non-uniform pricing, uniform pricing is suboptimal from the perspective of revenue maximization of the MBS. However, it is worth pointing out that uniform pricing is indeed optimal for the sum-rate maximization of the femtocell users. The following proposition affirms this property.
Proposition 5.1: For a given interference power constraint Q, the sum-rate of the femtocell users is maximized by the uniform pricing scheme.
Proof: The proof is available in [10] .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, several numerical examples are provided to evaluate the performances of the proposed resource allocation strategies. A two-tier spectrum-sharing femtocell network with one MBS and three femtocells is considered. Without loss of generality, the channel power gains are chosen as follows: h 1,1 = 1, h 2,2 = 1, h 3,3 = 1, g 1 = 0.01, g 2 = 0.1, and g 3 = 1. For simplicity, we assume that the variance of the noise is 1, and the payoff factors λ i , ∀i are all equal to 1.
A. Example 1: Uniform Pricing vs. Non-Uniform Pricing: Throughput-Revenue Tradeoff
Figs. 2 and 3 show the macrocell revenue and the sumrate of femtocell users, respectively, versus the maximum tolerable interference margin Q at the MBS, with uniform or non-uniform pricing. It is observed that for the same Q, the revenue of the MBS under the non-uniform pricing scheme is in general larger than that under the uniform pricing scheme, while the reverse is generally true for the sum-rate of femtocell users. These observations are in accordance with our discussions given in Section V. In addition, it is worth noting that when Q is sufficiently small, the revenues of the MBS become equal for the two pricing schemes, so are the sumrates of femtocell users. This is because when Q is very small, there is only one femtocell active in the network, and thus by comparing (16) and (19), the non-uniform pricing scheme is same as the uniform pricing counterpart in the single-femtocell case. It is also observed that when Q is sufficiently large, the revenues of the MBS converge to the same value for the two pricing schemes. This can be explained as follows. For the non-uniform pricing scheme, when Q is very large, it is observed from (16) that μ i 's all become very small, and thus the objective function of Problem 4.2 converges to N i=1 λ i as Q → ∞. On the other hand, for the uniform pricing scheme, the revenue of the MBS can be written as μ * Q at the optimal point, which is equal to
when Q is very large (cf.
(19)). Clearly, this value will converge to
B. Example 2: Comparison of Interference Prices of Femtocell Users under Non-Uniform Pricing
In this example, we examine the optimal interference prices of the femtocell users vs. Q under non-uniform pricing. It is observed from Fig. 4 that, for the same Q, the interference price for femtocell user 1 is the highest, while that for femtocell user 3 is the lowest. This is true due the fact that 2 indicates that the corresponding femtocell can achieve a higher profit (transmission rate) with the same amount network resource (transmit power) consumed. Therefore, the user with a larger λihi,i giσ 2 has a willingness to pay a higher price to consume the network resource. It is also observed that the interference prices for all femtocell users decrease with the increasing of Q, which can be easily inferred from (16). Intuitively, this can be explained by the practical rule of thumb that a seller would like to price lower if it has a large amount of goods to sell. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, price-based power allocation strategies are investigated for the uplink transmission in a spectrum-sharing two-tier femtocell network using game theory. An interference power constraint is applied to guarantee the quality-of-service (QoS) of the MBS. Then, the Stackelberg game model is adopted to jointly study the utility maximization of the MBS and femtocell users. The optimal pricing and power allocation strategies are examined, and closed-form solutions are obtained. Specifically, two pricing schemes are proposed and the relationship between these two schemes is studied. The results of this paper will be useful to the practical design of interference control in spectrum-sharing femtocell networks.
